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Drawing on a qualitative study of fast moving consumer good manufacturers’ 
management of development of line extensions, the purpose of this paper is to 
pinpoint implications of such management for manufacturers’ relations with 
retailers. Especially, the study suggests that manufacturers emphasising brands 
are likely to choose a “stand alone” approach towards retailers whilst manufac-
turers emphasising products are more likely (1) to collaborate with retailers 
whilst developing line extensions and (2) to engage in private label product de-
velopment and production. Apart from the fact that the study suggests retailers 
to influence manufacturers’ levels of innovativeness in relation to line exten-
sions, the study further suggests that manufacturers can be divided into two dif-
ferent groups on the basis of their line extension development activities. On the 
basis of these two different approaches, the paper points to implications for re-
tailers’ management of manufacturer relations. 
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Fast moving consumer good (FMCG) manufacturers rely on strong brands 
when introducing new products. For example, Aaker (1991) and Gallo (1992) 
report that around 9 out of 10 new consumer product launches qualify as line 
extensions (i.e.  launching new products as part of an existing brand within 
product categories, in which the focal brand is already represented by other 
products). Especially, the increasing popularity of line extensions seems to de-
pend on advantages inherent in brand leveraging, e.g. gaining retailer accep-
tance of, or even support to, the new product or increasing probability of con-
sumer trial purchases (Keller 1998). Nonetheless, practitioners’ shift from de-
velopment and launch of new products towards development and launch of ex-
tensions has not received much attention from neither new product development 
(NPD) researchers nor branding scholars. This paper accounts for some key 
findings of a qualitative study on how and why FMCG companies manage line 
extending NPD activities. The study identified strong linkages between FMCG 
manufacturers’ NPD activities and retailers’ relations with such manufacturers 
and accordingly, the paper discusses implications for retailers’ management of 
relations with manufacturers. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, the paper introduces the empirical 
study, upon which the paper draws as well as key findings hereof. Due to the 
paper’s focus on implications of the study’s findings for retailers, the next sec-
tion focuses on findings regarding retailer relationships. Finally, the last section 
explicates implications for retailers. 
2.  The Empirical Study 
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Initially, the empirical study was initiated by the author’s curiosity as to the dif-
ferences between two major streams of literature (i.e. NPD literature and brand 
management literature) and actual NPD activities of Danish FMCG manufac-
turers (i.e. development and launch of line extensions). Further investigation of 
the NPD literature and the literature on brand management combined with con-siderations on actual NPD practices suggested that although most FMCG manu-
facturers develop and launch line extensions (i.e. around 90 percent of launched 
products qualifies as brand or line extensions), academicians seldom focus on 
such phenomena. On the contrary, the two bodies of literature seemed to focus 
on other issues than linkages between (development of) physical products and 
brands. First, the literature on brand management focuses on brands and pays 
little attention to products, upon which brands supervene. Thus, primarily this 
stream of research is concerned with emotional dimensions “added” to products 
by advertising. As a result, this stream of research holds the product dimension 
“constant” and thus, it neglects issues on how companies manage identification, 
evaluation, and development of line extensions. Secondly, the NPD literature 
focuses on development of new products and thus, one would intuitively expect 
development of line extensions to be an integral part of this stream of research. 
However, mostly the NPD literature ignores brands. Furthermore, the extent to 
which this stream of literature incorporates brands equalises situations in which: 
(1) New brands are developed for truly new products to carry or (2) An estab-
lished brand (label) is attached to a new product after product issues are re-
solved. In sum, it thus seemed that both streams of literature told part of the 
story on how to identify, evaluate, and develop line extensions. However, none 
of them seemed to offer the “whole” story. As a result, the purpose of the em-
pirical study was to offer a “better” story, or more precisely: 
To develop an understanding of management of NPD projects in those 
situations, in which the company wishes to extend the brand to a new 




Drawing on Bloom and Perry (2001, p. 380) “many suppliers are reportedly 
feeling squeezed and pressured by giant retailers”. In the present context, it is 
the feelings (or perceptions; or enactments) of manufacturers that are focal. 
Hence, the purpose of the empirical study was not to observe or measure “ac-
tual” squeezes or pressures on manufacturers; instead the purpose was to de-
velop a deeper understanding of certain entities and activities from manufactur-
ers’ perspectives. Especially, the soundness of focusing on manufacturers’ per-ceptions (and retailers’ to a lesser extent) is grounded in the belief that it is such 
perceptions that guide manufacturers’ (and retailers’) actions. 
 
In sum, the empirical study focuses on small, medium-sized, and large Danish 
manufacturers; brands of such manufacturers that hold “some” degree of con-
sumer franchise; recent new product launches of such manufacturers that qual-
ify as line extensions; management of line extending projects; and both corpo-
rate and product brands are included in the study. In continuation, the study is a 
multiple case study, which draws on 14 company cases and 12 expert inter-
views. 
 
The empirical study neither qualifies as theory-testing case study research as 
advocated by Yin (1989) nor does it correspond to Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) 
grounded theory. Instead, the empirical study qualifies as theory-building case 
study research. Specifically, data are generated and analysed on the basis of 
combination of elements of Eisenhardt (1989), Miles and Huberman (1984), 
and Yin (1989). 
 
Although depth of investigation of individual company cases is dubitable, there 
seems to be no reason why the findings of the study do not reflect the “arche-
types” of management of line extending projects that exist across the population 
of Danish FMCG companies. Especially, this claim is corroborated by the fact 
that the 12 expert interviews (intended to supplement company cases) include 
interviews with retailers, advertising agencies, and other experts knowledgeable 
about FMCG companies’ development and launches of line extensions and that 
these expert interviews suggested robustness of findings of company cases. 
Also, the claim is corroborated by the fact that literal and theoretical replication 
logics underlie the choosing of companies to be included in the study so that the 
study covers a variety of product categories, company sizes, extent of product 
development and launches, etc. 
 
 
93.  Findings of the Study; “Productors” versus “Safe 
Players” 
A key finding of the empirical study is that FMCG manufacturers differ signifi-
cantly on relative importance ascribed to products and brands respectively. The 
distinction between manufacturers on the basis of importance ascribed to brands 
and products qualifies as an enhancement of our understanding of manufactur-
ers, Especially, this claim draws on the facts that (1) turning to the brand man-
agement literature, we assume most manufacturers – and certainly successful 
manufacturers – to emphasise brands and (2) turning to the NPD literature we 
assume manufacturers not to emphasise brand related issues when developing 
new products. The empirical study suggests that brand emphasis is not the way 
all manufacturers think and/or prioritise. Contradictive to extant branding litera-
ture, the study actually suggests that companies choose  between brand and 
product emphasis and thus, brand emphasis (or not) seems to relate to deliberate 
strategic choices and not – as suggested by brand researchers and academicians 
– to the most (only?) reasonable way to manage brands and products. On the 
basis of variation between companies emphasising brands and products respec-
tively, the cluster of manufacturers emphasising brands and brand equity is la-
belled “safe players” whereas the cluster of companies emphasising products is 
labelled “productors”. The term “safe player” is applied to characterised com-
panies emphasising brands due to the fact that a key rationale underlying the 
development activities of these companies is to “safe play” their brand(s). Con-
versely, companies who “think” products in relation to development activities – 
with little consideration of impact of new line extensions on the parent brand – 
are labelled “productors” as product focus characterises development activities 
of such companies. Drawing on the identification of the two clusters of compa-
nies, a key contribution of the empirical study is that it identifies (or at least 
creates awareness of) the fact that companies choose to “think” predominantly 
brands or products and thus, deliberately manufacturers choose between manag-
ing different entities within line extending NPD projects (i.e. brands and indi-
vidual products respectively). 
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 For companies classified as “productors”, products are considered to be of 
greater importance than brands. As a result, “productor” companies consider 
branding to be marketing departments’ external activities of a more tactical 
and/or operational nature. Moreover, the product emphasis of these companies 
manifests itself in product development activities, in which the physical product 
and the task of solving product issues are of prominence. As opposed to “pro-
ductor” companies, “safe players” are manufacturers, for whom brand man-
agement underlies most, or all, activities in which marketing departments are 
involved, including NPD and management of such activities. Thus, branding 
and brand management are considered to be the rationale underlying compa-
nies’ activities in general and product-related activities in particular. Significant 
differences arise between “productors” and “safe players” on a number of ac-
counts. Broadly speaking, NPD activities in “safe playing” companies do not 
start with a product idea. Instead, in these companies the starting point of NPD 
projects is strategic, brand-related issues and thus, new products are considered 
to be vehicles for brand building. As a result, a holistic approach to branding 
underlies NPD in these companies. In continuation, brand equity related con-
siderations seem important in relation to “safe players” (management of) exten-
sion development projects whereas such considerations are not integral parts of 
“productors” development activities. In continuation, the study corroborates the 
claim on the vast majority of NPD activities in FMCG companies qualifying as 
development of line extensions (Aaker, 1991; Gallo, 1992) and thus, that – 
compared to brand extending manufacturers – “safe playing” manufacturers fa-
vour less risky product development projects, the end results of which are char-
acterised by lower degrees of novelty to the company and alignment with strong 
brands and present product portfolios of such brands. Concordant with Rieze-
bos (2003), “safe playing” companies thus seem to perceive successful brands 
within a product class as barriers to entry whilst they do not agree on his claim 
that brand extensions are a means to enter new product categories. 
 
“Safe played” brands supervene on one, or a few, closely related product cate-
gories. Such “supervenience” is the end result of deliberate decision processes 
at top management, which have lead to the concentration of activities in extant 
 
11product categories. Also, main reasons informants explicated why these com-
panies concentrate on a few product categories are that brand extending activi-
ties would be too risky; that brand extension failure would harm marketing 
managers’ positions while success would not support marketing managers to a 
large extent; and that extant product categories ensure acceptable performance 
and/or growth levels. In sum, “safe players” do not hamper with their successful 
brands; and they seem to do so quite successfully. Furthermore, a myopic view 
of brands on marketing managers’ behalves implies that “safe playing” market-
ing managers manage brands and NPD activities within boundaries of extant 
product categories. As a result, “myopic” marketing managers and departments 
are highly specialised and become extremely knowledgeable on brand and NPD 
management within narrowly defined product categories. The study further 
suggests that one-to-one correspondence with flagship categories and continu-
ous development and launch of extensions within such categories incorporate 
some sort of learning-curve advantages, on the basis of which “safe played” 
brands become very strong. However, line extensions developed and launched 
by “safe players” seem to fall into two different categories: Most “safe played” 
line extensions qualify as slot-filler expansions whereas a few “safe” line exten-
sions qualify as new attribute extensions. 
 
“Safe players” development of new attribute line extensions qualifies as NPD 
processes characterised by higher degrees of risk as well as more resource de-
manding projects. Also, new attribute line extensions have greater effects on the 
focal product category whereas slot-filling extensions, most often, increase 
short-term market share and/or cause cannibalisation. In sum, “safe players” 
thus seem to manage NPD project portfolios that encompass a few new attribute 
extension projects that may ultimately expand and develop the focal product 
category as well as a rather large number of “low maintenance” slot-filling ex-
tension projects, the main purpose of which is to generate new products that 
bolster the brand’s position in the product category against competition. 
 
For “productors”, the choice to focus NPD on development and launch of line 
extensions is grounded more in considerations for core competencies and pro-
 
12duction-based synergies than in brand-related considerations. Furthermore, 
“productors” seem to rely heavily on slot-filling line extensions and considera-
bly less on new attribute line extensions than “safe players” do. Consequently, 
one might claim “productors” to be less engaged in category expansion than 
“safe players”. Another interesting feature of the “productor” group of manu-
facturers is that they are “accidentally” in charge of strong brands more than 
strengths of brands being end results of past brand building and maintaining ac-
tivities. This feature was quite surprising as the branding literature claims that 
“good” brand management is a prerequisite for manufacturers’ having strong 
brands. However, the study suggests that some brands’ strengths have more to 
do with the companies’ flagship products being introduced around forty or fifty 
years ago (i.e. at times characterised by less crowded product and brand land-
scapes and product shortage) than with successful brand management and/or 
managers acting as brand custodians. As such, the study suggests that “good” 
brand and NPD management may not be required in order to “have” strong 
brands and products. Another key characteristic of the “productor” group of 
companies is that they believe superior physical products and shelfspace to be 
the ways, in which brands are built whereas “safe players” engage in traditional, 
consumer-oriented brand building activities (i.e. advertising) to a much greater 
extent. Although “productors” rely heavily on development and launch of slot-
filler line extensions, a few “productors” engage in development of new prod-
ucts to be launched in categories with which the company has no prior experi-
ence. However, a unique characteristic of such development projects is that 
products are developed for – or in collaboration with – retailers and subse-
quently, such products are launched as private labels. Thus, for the majority of 
“productor” companies, product emphasis inhibits development of products 
characterised by higher degrees of newness (e.g. new attribute line extensions). 
Some validation of the claim that “productor” companies are not fit to develop 
products, for which degrees of newness to the company and/or consumers are 
higher is to be found in Leonard-Barton (1992). Elaborating on Leonard-Barton 
(1992), one may claim that product emphasis qualifies as a core competence 
that might inhibit NPD. Consequently, “productors” may be especially capable 
 
13of developing slot-filling line extensions whereas line extensions developed by 
“safe players” may qualify as either slot-filling or new attribute line extensions. 
 
The empirical study further suggests that “safe players” myopic view of brands 
acts as a – deliberately sought - core rigidity limiting NPD to extant product 
categories. As such, the study suggests that the “lack of innovativeness” that is 
often ascribed to FMCG manufacturers is not merely attributable to “poor” 
NPD management. Instead, the reasons why such manufacturers do not develop 
highly innovative products may relate to fundamental values of these compa-
nies, e.g. brand myopia or product emphasis. Consequently, the study suggests 
that it may be too simplistic to ascribe low levels of innovativeness on behalf of 
FMCG manufacturers to inability to implement key success factors. Instead, the 
study indicates that low levels of FMCG innovativeness might qualify as delib-
erate strategic choices and/or natural consequences of competence profiles of 
such companies. 
 
In continuation of the distinction between “productors” and “safe players”, 
manufacturers included in the study seem to differ in their prioritisation of ac-
tivities traditionally labelled “push” and “pull”. Randall (1994) comes to the 
high-falutin conclusion that two – and only two – strategies are pursuable for 
FMCG manufacturers: To build strong brands or to deliver outstanding cus-
tomer service to retailers. Thus, Randall (1994) advocates that manufacturers 
should concentrate efforts and resources on either “push” or “pull” marketing 
activities. Initially, I did certainly not agree on such reduction of manufacturers’ 
strategic alternatives to a simple choice between traditional push and pull 
strategies. However, some evidence in favour of Randall’s (1994) conclusion 
was obtained. Thus, interdependencies do seem to exist between the two strate-
gic alternatives. Mainly, such interdependencies are grounded in the fact that 
“safe playing” manufacturers involve retailers in NPD to a far lesser extent than 
manufacturers, the brands of whom hold less consumer franchise. Thus, retailer 
involvement in NPD activities ranges from arm-length approaches adopted by 
“safe playing” manufacturers to activities equivalent to von Hippel’s (1978) 
customer active paradigm for “productor” companies. Moreover, “productors” 
 
14find strong partnerships with retailers to be the factor most decisive for success 
whereas “safe players” mainly relate success to brands, brand management, and 
consumer franchise. In continuation, “productors” engage in private label pro-
duction whereas most of the “safe players” included in the study have made a 
deliberate choice not to engage themselves in such production. Thus, the study 
indicates that the greater the brand emphasis, the lesser the probability of 
FMCG manufacturers being engaged in private label production whilst prob-
ability of manufacturers’ engaging in pull activities increases. Likewise, the 
study suggests that the greater the product emphasis, the greater the probability 
of a FMCG manufacturer being engaged in private label production. 
 
In sum, FMCG manufacturers’ relations with retailers seem to resemble “col-
laboration” versus “stand alone” choices. As such, most “productors” seem to 
be highly dependent on retailers and, for example, they engage in private label 
production; they involve retailers in NPD to a large extent; and they find push 
strategies much more effective than pull strategies. At the other extreme, “safe 
players” find that sustainable competitive advantage is built through strong con-
sumer franchise. Especially, the wish to build strong consumer franchise makes 
“safe players” focus on pull strategies; delineates engagement in private label 
products; and advocates that retailers are not involved in NPD. As such, empha-
sis on pull strategies is one element in “safe playing” manufacturers’ quest for 
sustainable competitive advantage by means of building brand equity and 
henceforward, strong brands. 
 
As for organisation of the NPD function, the study suggests that – apart from 
large corporations - all companies adopt approaches according to which project 
managers (PMs) are also engaged in marketing existing products. Howley 
(2002) found that a similar approach was adopted by half of the medium-sized 
and large FMCG companies included in his study. Further, this finding falsified 
his initial assumption that medium-sized and large FMCG companies would 
have separate departments for NPD. The current study expands on Howley’s 
(2002) findings as it suggests that, in general, we would not expect FMCG 
manufacturers to have separate NPD departments. Instead, we would expect 
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ing existing products. Furthermore, trustworthiness of such expectations in-
creases with decreasing company size. Thus, the study indicates that the smaller 
the company, the greater the likelihood of marketing NPD dominance whilst 
separate NPD departments is a characteristic uniquely attributable to large 
companies. In continuation, absence of separate NPD departments in “any-but-
large” companies indicates that we may expect NPD activities of FMCG com-
panies to be characterised by market pull to a far greater extent than it is charac-
terised by technology push. Thus, the absence of separate R&D departments 
combined with the fact that, in all companies included in the study, PMs are lo-
cated in marketing departments indicate that people engaged in line extension 
development activities have easier access to market (consumer) knowledge than 
to technological knowledge. Consequently, the dominance of market pull might 
also offer part of the reason why development and launches of line extensions 
predominate across the population of manufacturers included in the study. 
 
The fact that mostly marketing personnel assumes PM roles whilst handling 
NPD suggests that problems associated with “ownership” when a new product 
is handed over to sales and marketing at the end of the NPD process are not 
prevalent for manufacturers included in the study. In particular, such problems 
are avoided due to the fact that marketing assumes “ownership” of both NPD 
processes and marketing of new products whilst they consider the issue of “sell-
ing” new products to sales departments to be of critical importance for ultimate 
success of new products. Furthermore, the task of “selling” to sales is of impor-
tance for both “productor” and “safe playing” companies. Nonetheless, such 
“selling” seems easier for “safe players” than for “productors” due to differ-
ences in distribution of power between sales and marketing departments. In 
fact, one might claim that levels of power held by sales departments in “produc-
tor” companies make marketing “productor” departments define sales as a 
dominant customer (along with retailers) upon the acceptance of whom the fu-
ture of the product relies. In continuation, the study suggests that “safe players” 
differentiate between new attribute and slot-filling line extension projects. Es-
pecially, such differentiation on “safe players” behalves leads to “safe players” 
 
16setting aside more time and resources for new attribute line extension projects 
whereas slot-filling activities are characterised by less devotion of time and re-
sources. Furthermore, management of new attribute extension projects has 
much in common with the project management literature whereas slot-filling 
extension activities may not even qualify as “projects”. As such, although the 
number of new attribute line extension projects that “saf players” engage in is 
small; the devotion of time and resources to these projects (compared to devo-
tion of time and resources to slot filler extension activities) makes these projects 
a substantial part of “safe players” entire portfolio of NPD activities. Conse-
quently, when moving from “productors” development of slot-filler line exten-
sions towards “safe players” development of new attribute line extensions the 
study suggests that devotion of time and resources as well as top management 
dedication to individual projects increase. As for the role that brand equity re-
lated considerations play in extension processes, the study suggests that such 
considerations are of minor, or even no, importance in “productors” develop-
ment of slot-filling line extensions whereas such considerations become in-
creasingly important when going towards “safe players” new attribute line ex-
tension processes. Consequently, the study suggests that: (1) Brand equity re-
lated considerations are not integral parts of “productors” line extension proc-
esses; (2) Such considerations are implicit in so far they underlie “safe playing” 
slot-filling line extension activities; and (3) Such considerations are explicit and 
important parts of “safe playing” new attribute extension projects. In figure 1, 
an attempt has been made to graphically describe the main characteristics of 
NPD processes for “safe players” and “productor” companies respectively. 
 
 
17Figure 1.  NPD Processes for Companies Included in the Study 
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         Promotion,
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           Launch
 
The reader should bear in mind that, by no means, the figure above is meant as 
a complete overview of activities included in different types of NPD activities. 
On the contrary, the sole purpose of the figure is to highlight the activities most 
different across “productors” and “safe players” extension activities. Further-
more, the purpose of figure 1 is to emphasise the key difference between “safe 
players” and “productors”, i.e. the role that brand equity related considerations 
play (not) within NPD projects. Gjøls-Andersen (2001, p. 26) discusses the 
problems LEGO experienced during the late 70s and concludes: “When evalu-
ating new product ideas, the same question was raised inside LEGO over and 
over: Is this close enough to the LEGO core idea?”. Drawing on the LEGO ex-
ample, the present study suggests that such questions are an integral and indeed 
crucial part of “safe players” initial NPD stages whereas such questions are not 
posed by “productors”. In the following paragraphs, the content of figure1 is 
discussed in greater depth. 
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body of literature focuses on these stages (McAdam & McClelland 2002). 
However, as most of the NPD literature, this body of literature focuses on suc-
cessful generation and evaluation of highly – or at least more - innovative prod-
uct ideas. As a result, the content of this body of literature is rather different 
from the findings of this study. For example, the literature suggests that creativ-
ity precedes innovation (Heap 1989; Majaro 1988; Zuang et al 1999) and thus, 
that idea generation is an activity separate from the downstream, more tangible, 
idea screening stage (McAdam & McClelland 2002; Osborn 1963). Neverthe-
less, such segregation of idea generation and screening is not identified in the 
present study. On the contrary, the study suggests that the lesser the degree of 
novelty of products that the company wishes to develop (i.e. the stronger the 
emphasis on development of slot-filling line extensions), the greater the insepa-
rabillty of the two stages. Accordingly, favouring development of slot-filler line 
extensions leaves little room for creativity in the initial stages of the NPD proc-
ess. Returning to the lower part of figure 1, “productor” companies’ initial 
stages of NPD activities do not qualify as highly creative. On the contrary, such 
activities are, extremely, closely aligned with present products and extant com-
petencies. As aforementioned, extant products and competencies may actually 
inhibit  new  product development in these companies as preoccupation with 
physical products and unwillingness to engage in NPD projects requiring high 
levels of investment in e.g. production equipment make “productors” engage in 
less risky and less novel NPD projects that, mostly, lead to development of slot-
filling line extensions. As for the remaining stages of “productor” companies’ 
NPD activities, more stages and especially, initial stages as well as consumer 
tests are skipped as the activities move toward “old product development”. As 
such, brand equity related considerations are not integral parts of “productor” 
extension activities. On the contrary, “productors” attach the brand to the exten-
sion whilst developing packaging, promotion, and/or advertising – with few, or 
no, explicit considerations on effects of such line extensions on brand equity. A 
key difference between “productor” and “safe playing” manufacturers’ line ex-
tension processes is that the latter group of companies applies tailored versions 
of the BAH model whereas the former has not adopted formal NPD process 
 
19models. As such, the study corroborates Howley’s (2002) claim that companies 
have adopted stage-gate models and especially the BAH model, in so far “safe 
playing” companies’ development of line extensions is concerned. Thus, the 
study suggests that stage-gate models are considered useful by “safe playing” 
companies while “productor” companies have not adopted such models. Fur-
ther, the study suggests that although “safe playing” companies apply stage-
gate models, they find it necessary to alter such models in order to make them 
suitable for line extension processes. 
 
In sum, the empirical study suggests that companies emphasising brands or 
products respectively differ fundamentally in their approaches to NPD. Espe-
cially, such differences are attributable to the fact that “safe playing” companies 
and “productor” companies manage entirely different entities. Thus, “safe play-
ers” manage brands and consider new products to be vehicles for brand building 
and strengthening whereas “productors” manage products and consider brands 
as additions to physical products. 
4.  Further Findings of the Study; Retailer 
Relationships 
Returning to the introductory part of the paper; a key finding of the study (al-
though not a line of results anticipated at the outset of the research process) was 
that manufacturers’ focus on brands or products respectively has profound ef-
fects for their relations with retailers. The purpose of this section is to account 
for such effects. 
 
Although somewhat simplistic, the study suggests that two “significant” types 
of linkages between retailers/advertising agencies and brand and NPD man-
agement exist. These two types of linkages are discussed subsequently (al-
though retailer effects are prioritised). 
 
 
20“Safe players” seem to draw on advertising agencies in relation to brand build-
ing and brand management. For example, such companies work closely with 
advertising agencies in measuring brand equity and in tracking effects of brand 
building activities. Furthermore, “safe players” seem to involve advertising 
agencies in NPD processes on a regular basis/as normal practice and further, 
such agencies may get involved in the earlier stages of the process. Especially, 
the study suggests that “safe players” involve advertising agencies in various 
elements of NPD processes (e.g. product and concept tests; development and 
tests of packaging; creative conversion of products and concepts into advertis-
ing; and development of in-store promotion materials) whereas “productors” 
mainly involve advertising agencies in development of packaging after “prod-
uct issues” are resolved – in so far “productors” involve advertising agencies at 
all. Consequently, there seems to be strong ties between brand focused strate-
gies and involvement of advertising agencies. Consequently, “safe players” rely 
more on advertising agencies when developing line extensions than “produc-
tors” do. In continuation, “productors” consider the work of advertising agen-
cies as something “added” to products whereas “safe players” involvement of 
advertising agencies in earlier stages of the development process (although not 
in the earliest stages) indicates that such companies may “live” the holistic ap-
proach to branding. Being quite critical – and possibly unfair – to advertising 
agencies, one might claim that they are so (pre)occupied with building emo-
tional dimensions to be added to products that they often neglect physical prod-
ucts. As such, advertising agencies might contribute to the “brands do not need 
products” doctrine to a large extent due to the simple fact that they are seldom 
part of NPD activities until after a product is actually developed. 
 
Turning to the critical issue of retailers’ effects on development of extensions, 
“safe playing” manufacturers keep “arm length” relationships with retailers and 
do not involve retailers in NPD activities. One interpretation of such differences 
in retailers’ importance in relation to line extension projects is that the less the 
degrees of novelty in extension projects, the more ultimate success of the exten-
sion product depends on retailers and thus, the more the manufacturer relies on 
retailers during the development process. Another interpretation is that retailers 
 
21simply qualify as increasingly valuable partners during development processes 
as extension products become less novel and thus, closer to products carried by 
retailers at present. “Productors” collaborate with retailers on a number of dif-
ferent issues. For example, such manufacturers include retailers in NPD activi-
ties. In some instances, such NPD collaboration between manufacturers and re-
tailers even qualify as “customer active” (von Hippel 1978). Meanwhile, these 
companies do not make use of advertising agencies’ brand building competen-
cies to a large extent. On the contrary, most “productors”, more or less deliber-
ately, choose to collaborate with a small advertising agency on a few, clearly 
pre-specified, tactical and/or operational issues. Mainly, such issues are devel-
opment of packaging and development of print ads. 
 
Comparison of effects of advertising agencies and retailers on line extension 
development processes indicates that manufacturers’ emphasis on brands or 
products seems to set the boundaries for their relationships with retailers and 
advertising agencies. Specifically, the study suggests that brand emphasis en-
courages companies to collaborate with advertising agencies whereas product 
emphasis advocates close relationships with retailers. As such, the present line 
of reasoning is closely aligned with the preceding discussion on management of 
fundamentally different entities in “safe playing” and “productor” companies. 
First, “safe playing” companies “think” brands and as a result, they turn to ad-
vertising agencies when managing such entities. Secondly, “productor” compa-
nies “think” products and thus, retailers’ focus on physical products and prices 
makes far more sense to such companies than advertising agencies’ preoccupa-
tion with extensive consumer advertising. In continuation of the discussion on 
management of different entities, the study suggests that no company has close 
relationships with advertising agencies and retailers simultaneously. As such, 
the study, vaguely, suggests that close collaboration with advertising agencies is 
a characteristic of companies that do not work closely with retailers whilst col-
laboration with retailers is sought by companies relying less on advertising 
agencies. Consequently and as mentioned previously, the findings of the study 
align with traditional “push-pull” thinking as brand emphasis favours pull 
strategies whereas product emphasis favours push strategies. 
 
22As for retailers’ effects on brand and NPD management, the study identified a 
number of such effects and further, the study suggested possible reasons why 
such effects exist. The purpose of the remainder of this section is to account for 
these effects and possible reasons why they exist (reasons are drawn from com-
pany cases as well as interviews with retailers). 
 
First, increasingly retailers seem to focus on their own brands and private label 
products and thus, increasingly they become aware of issues such as retailer 
differentiation, image, and positioning. As a result, although “safe played” 
brands’ ability to build store traffic may not become less important, retailers 
may also have increased their focus on “productors” ability to support retailers’ 
own brands. 
 
Secondly, more and more it seems that retailers possess information on con-
sumers and as a result, manufacturers’ marketing departments are not the expert 
on consumers. On the contrary, retailers’ scanner data may qualify as the most 
valid information on consumer behaviour. Consequently, a manufacturer rely-
ing on (some, not much) traditional market research and/or internal marketing 
knowledge in relation to product development may experience that retailers re-
ject ready-to-launch new products – or at least such manufacturers may be ac-
cused of not “doing their homework” before presenting line extensions to re-
tailers. In fact, the study suggests that – to a greater or lesser extent - manufac-
turers do present some extensions to retailers although retailers do not find such 
extensions to be “ready for launch”. Henceforward the study suggests that dur-
ing the development process manufacturers’ kill rates for extension candidates 
are lower than retailers could wish for – or at least manufacturers may have 
skipped stages and activities to a greater extent than retailers would wish for 
(retailers’ inclination to accept new products on the basis of manufacturers’ 
“making it worthwhile” for them excluded). Drawing on preceding accounts, 
especially “productors” did skip stages and activities of development processes 
and thus, one might claim especially “productors” to confront retailers with ex-
tensions that are not “ready to launch”. 
 
 
23Thirdly, increasingly European retailing is comprised of fewer and larger retail 
chains. The size of such “euro-chains” alone implies that manufacturers must 
collaborate closer with retailers in order to access consumers. Furthermore, 
large retail chains seemingly reduce assortments in many product categories; 
leaving only room for a couple of manufacturers’ brands and a private label in 
each category. Obviously, such reductions in assortments affect FMCG manu-
facturers profoundly. Especially, the study suggests that increasingly retailers 
expect manufacturers’ brands to “drive” product categories. As such, the main 
(or sole?) reason why retailers should carry manufacturers’ brands is that (by 
means of innovation) manufacturers extend and expand categories. As a result, 
the study suggests that development and launch of slot-filling line extensions 
does  not  meet retailers’ expectations whereas new attribute line extensions 
qualify as the type of activities that retailers expect brand manufacturers to un-
dertake. Although vaguely, the study thus suggests that “safe players” are more 
valuable partners for retailers than “productors” are (private label development 
and production excluded). Also, the study suggests that (1) slot-filler line exten-
sions neither extend nor expand product categories; (2) manufacturers – and es-
pecially “productors” – do rely heavily on development and introduction of 
slot-filler line extensions; and (3) retailers expect manufacturers’ brands to ex-
tend and expand product categories through development and launch of “new” 
extension products; expectations that cannot be met by launches of slot-filler 
line extensions alone. 
 
Fourth, retailers experience (or “enact”) that consumers request new products. 
As a result, retailers expect FMCG manufacturers to develop new products on a 
continuous basis. Retailers thus expect manufacturers to develop more  new 
products than most manufacturers feel that they are actually capable of. As es-
pecially “productors” find that they do not have the time, resources, and/or ca-
pabilities necessary for developing new products at the rate requested by retail-
ers, most “productors” (and some “safe players”) fall into the trap of “incremen-
tality”. The notion (or made-up word) “incrementality” refers to the fact that 
some brand manufacturers try to keep up with retailers’ requests for new prod-
ucts by developing incrementally, or marginally, new products. As such, new 
 
24products are not significantly different from extant products, nor do they offer 
any “real” advantage compared to extant products. Slot-filling line extensions 
thus seem to predominate some manufacturers’ thinking as they are capable of 
developing and launching incrementally new (slot filler) line extensions on time 
and budget whereas development of radically new products – or “just” new at-
tribute line extensions - is not possible at the rate requested by retailers. 
 
Concluding on retailer relationships, retailers’ (excessive?) requests for new 
products seem to be a main reason why companies included in the study – and 
especially “productors” - develop a host of slot filler line extensions that are 
only incrementally new and which may not offer any real product advantage. 
Moreover, heavy demands for new products seem to prohibit manufacturers 
from developing “truly” new products, including new attribute line extensions. 
A couple of arguments favour this line of reasoning. First, manufacturers are so 
preoccupied with development of “incremental”, slot filler line extensions in 
order to satisfy retailers that they cannot find the time or set aside the resources 
necessary for engaging in more demanding and risky development projects. 
Secondly, marketing departments may be so preoccupied with line extending 
activities that no time is left for strategic issues. As the preliminary, strategic 
stage is of critical importance in relation to new attribute line extension pro-
jects, such preoccupation may lead to situations, in which manufacturers do not 
engage in new attribute line extension activities. Finally, manufacturers may not 
be able to make a profit on truly new products or new attribute line extensions 
as both retailers and consumers are getting accustomed to products having 
shorter and shorter life cycles and retailers become better and better at introduc-
ing “copy cat” private label products. Thus, manufacturers may have difficulties 
in earning back the resources necessary to develop products, newness of which 
is greater to the company and/or customers. 
 
Drawing on the preceding sections, some manufacturers (and especially “pro-
ductors”) seem to assume reactive roles in relation to product development. A 
major part of the reactive role is the continuous flow of slot filler line extension 
introductions characterised by no, or at least minor, product advantages. More-
 
25over, many manufacturers have difficulties setting aside time and resources for 
more demanding development activities (i.e. development of new attribute line 
extensions). Thus, retailers’ requests for new products seem to be a main reason 
why “incrementality” prevails and why some product development activities do 
not qualify as strategically grounded couplings of brands with opportunities in-
herent in the market. Especially, retailers’ requests for new products are major 
threats against smaller, e.g. Danish FMCG manufacturers, who are less re-
sourceful than international or global FMCG companies (e.g. Procter & Gam-
ble, Unilever, and Nestlé). Especially, global or international players are capa-
ble of launching an endless (?) stream of new products due to the simple fact 
that, at present, they hold product portfolios that, at a global level, contain nu-
merous opportunities for “new” product launches in new geographical markets. 
As a result, such players can introduce new attribute as well as slot filler line 
extensions at low costs and with development (or more preciously: adoption) 
times close to none. Thus, these players hold competitive advantage in relation 
to introduction of line extensions as compared to smaller Danish FMCG manu-
facturers, who have to develop such extensions (scenarios of copy cat products 
excluded). 
 
As for private labels, the study suggests that manufacturers adopt one of two 
different approaches to private labels. First, a number of companies, deliber-
ately, choose not to engage in private label production. Secondly, a number of 
companies do engage in private label production although their commitment to 
such production is less than one would expect. The purpose of the following 
paragraphs is to account for these two different approaches to private label pro-
duction. 
 
The group of companies that have decided not to engage in private label pro-
duction (PLP) is comprised of “safe playing” manufacturers. The main reason 
offered by these companies why they do not wish to engage in PLP is that such 
engagement would harm their brands. Moreover, such reasoning is grounded in 
actual experiences as most of these manufacturers have been engaged in PLP 
and subsequently, they have chosen to withdraw from such activities. A closer 
 
26look at PLP experiences of “safe players” revealed a number of reasons why 
they engaged in PLP initially. However, as such reasons are very much aligned 
with the reasons offered by the second group of manufacturers as to why they 
are currently engaged in PLP, this line of reasoning is not pursued any further at 
present. Thus, the remainder of the account for “safe playing” manufacturers 
that are not engaged in PLP is concerned with reasons why not to engage in 
PLP. PLP is considered to be harmful to most “safe played” brands. Especially, 
such harm is based on similarities between branded and private label products – 
physical similarity as well as similarity as perceived by consumers; similarities 
caused by “safe playing” companies’ product and production related competen-
cies. In fact, such competencies act as core rigidities as “safe players” are not 
capable of – effectively and efficiently - producing private label products much 
different from branded products. As a result, “safe players” deliberately avoid 
PLP in order not to dilute the brand by means of private label products very 
similar to branded products – and especially to new attribute line extensions. 
Consequently, the study suggests that engagement in PLP holds the potential to 
severely damage and dilute brands – in so far manufacturers are unable to dif-
ferentiate branded products from private label products. Further, the study sug-
gests that such lack of differentiation is especially problematic for “safe play-
ing” companies. As such, the study suggests that private label products harm 
“safe played” brands due to the fact that “safe players” have specialised in mak-
ing high quality products in narrowly defined product categories and thus, pri-
vate label products would qualify as lower priced products very similar to 
branded products on every dimension but the emotional (i.e. symbolic and/or 
hedonic) brand dimension. 
 
Most “productors” - and a few “safe players” - engage in PLP. Two main ex-
planations are offered by informants as to why they engage in such activities. 
As mentioned previously, these explanations are quite similar to the reasons of-
fered by most “safe players” as to why they initially engaged in PLP although 
they withdrew from such activities later on. The first explanation is that al-
though PLP may harm branded products and thus, the brand, retailers will offer 
private labels to consumers “no matter what”. Although reluctantly, “produc-
 
27tors” and a few “safe players” thus feel that they are better off producing private 
label products than they would be had they turned down retailers’ requests for 
private label products. Thus, competitors’ engagements in PLP qualify as worst 
case scenarios for “productors” and a few “safe players”, who engage in PLP to 
avoid such scenarios. Deeper investigation of such scenarios revealed that “the 
greatest private label fear” of such companies is that “foreign competitors” (i.e. 
competitors (1) whose brands are heavily affiliated with, or even market leaders 
within, the category in other geographical markets while (2) their brands are not 
to be found on retailers’ shelves in countries, in which the focal brand domi-
nates) may engage in PLP in order to enter this geographical market. Thus, 
these manufacturers engage in PLP to protect their brands’ positions on retail-
ers’ shelves although such engagement may dilute branded products. Espe-
cially, such dilution is attributable to the fact that these companies produce pri-
vate label products very similar to their branded products. Further investigation 
of such similarities revealed that PLP engagement generates products that do 
not offer retailers (any) differential advantage. On the contrary, private label 
products qualify as “duplicates” of branded products that are mostly inferior in 
regard to consumer franchise. As a result, retailers’ main objectives in relation 
to such private label products are to increase margins, primarily through reduc-
tions in manufacturers’ prices as well as to signal “cheapness” (or quality-for-
money) to consumers. Evidently, retailers thus wish to pressure prices on pri-
vate label products. Turning the table once more, “productors” experiencing 
such pressures on prices reduce costs of PLP as much as possible. One obvious 
“cost reduction candidate” is NPD and as a result, even “safe players” who ini-
tially wanted to differentiate private label products from branded products may 
abandon such differentiation attempts in their pursuit of (NPD) cost reductions. 
In sum, focus on cost reduction and lack of differential advantage lead to situa-
tions, in which manufacturers reluctantly produce private label products at the 
lowest costs possible. Consequently, such situations are characterised by de-
tached manufacturers and price-focused retailers. In some situations, detach-
ment on manufacturers’ behalves leads to continuous dilution of quality of pri-
vate label products in order to decrease material and production costs. In other 
situations, manufacturers seek to cut costs by producing private label products 
 
28in the same way that they produce branded products. The reader might recall 
that these situations equalise the brand damaging core production rigidities that 
“safe players” identified as a major reason why not to engage in PLP. The main 
advantage gained from producing private label products that qualify as branded 
products “in disguise” (i.e. identical physical products differentiated through 
logos and packaging only) is that manufacturers do not have to invest in PLP 
production lines, nor do they experience lay offs in production flows when pro-
duction is changed to meet private label and branded product specifications re-
spectively. Evidently, such cost reduction attempts hamper the brand in so far 
consumers are aware of “identicality” of branded and private label products. 
 
The other main reason why “productors” engage in PLP is sales departments’ 
“prominence” in “productor” companies. Further, the pattern of prominence in 
“productor” companies suggests that short-term bottom-line success criteria at 
the product level predominate. As a result, “productors” are more likely to en-
gage in PLP and especially so in relation to private label products of inferior 
quality and/or offered at lower prices than products affiliated with manufactur-
ers’ brands. Thus, the study suggests that “productors” engage in PLP to opti-
mise short-term sales and with little consideration as to long-term effects of 
PLP on brands. However, the study also suggests that the kind of PLP that 
“productors” engage in dilutes brands. Especially, such dilution is caused by 
pressures for new product introductions. In practice, what happens is that retail-
ers request that new branded products should be launched as private label prod-
ucts as well – or even before they are introduced as branded products. As such, 
the study validates that retailers might be more concerned with the well-being 
of private labels than with that of manufacturers’ brands – at least in situations 
in which manufacturers settle for development and launch of slot-filling line 
extensions. As an obvious result, retailers are not pleased with situations, in 
which private labels’ product portfolios qualify as “leftovers” from manufac-
turer brands’ portfolios and as another result, retailers wish for private label 
portfolios to include the “newest” products. In sum, a main reason why “pro-
ductors” as well as “safe players” are unsatisfied with PLP is that it erodes the 
ability of new products to build equity for manufacturers’ brands. Thus, retail-
 
29ers’ “pressures” for introduction of new products as private label products (as 
enacted by manufacturers) might also be a reason why “productors” prefer de-
velopment and launch of new products characterised by low degrees of novelty 
and low levels of development costs. Simultaneously, retailers are unpleased 
with manufacturers, who settle for development and launch of slot-filling line 
extensions as such activities are not concordant with retailers’ demands on 
brand manufacturers, i.e. demands to expand and extend product categories by 
means of innovative extension products. 
5.  Implications for Retailers 
One finding of the empirical study is that it corroborates Ailawadi’s (2001) 
claim that although private brands qualify as a profitable strategy for retailers, 
retailers need national brands as well. However, a key contribution of this paper 
to extant knowledge on retailer-manufacturer relations is that it elaborates on 
the duality of retailers’ needs for manufacturers (i.e. retailers need to collabo-
rate both with manufacturers of strong national brands and with manufacturers 
supplying retailers with private brand products). Obviously, a key managerial 
implication – although not a normative piece of advice – is that consistency is 
to be pursued across the multiple decisions and activities that “productors” and 
“equators” engage in. In table 1 an attempt is made to summarise the manage-
rial implications for manufacturers. 
 
 
30Table 1. Managerial Implications for Manufacturers 
  Safe Players  Productors 
Purpose of  
NPD 
To preserve and enhance brand position 
within extant product categories as well 
as to drive these product categories 
To enable the company to develop and 






Develop and launch new attribute (and 
slot-filler) line extensions in order to 
expand/extend and hence, to drive cate-
gory (protect brand) and increase brand 
equity 
Develop slot-filler line extensions to main-
tain facings and satisfy retailers’ requests 
for continuous launch of new products. 
Develop private label products 
Perspective 
Thinking brands within the scope and 
limits of products categories currently 
affiliated with the brand 
Thinking products in order to satisfy retail-









Moderate - Due to brand myopia and 
inertia 
High - Due to marketing’ limited resources 
Main deficits 
Safe playing and brand myopia may 
qualify as “blindfolds” or “bias against 
innovation”. 
Brands may act as core rigidities in 
relation to NPD 
Due to decades of product emphasis it may 
be “too late” and “too costly” for produc-
tors to change paths. 
Product emphasis acts as a core rigidity in 
NPD 
Key advantages 
Building strong brands within focal 
product categories. 
Marketing departments qualify as “ex-
perts” on such categories 
“Experts” on products – especially cost 
and production related skills and  





Brand fit related considerations; 
Commitment from top management 
Development and launch resources 
“Newness” compared to extant 
products 
Sales departments’ commitment and sup-
port 
Gaining retailers’ support 




31One way in which we may interpret table 1 is that the set of competencies nec-
essary in order to be “excellent” – or at least competitive – differs across the 
archetypes identified by the current study. Thus, “productors” and “safe play-
ers” build different sets of competencies. Consequently, retailers should be 
aware of the fact that “productors” and “safe players” hold different sets of 
competencies. Drawing on the different sets of competencies of “safe players” 
and “productors” respectively, retailers are thus able to manage relations with 
each type of manufacturers in ways that maximise benefits offered to the re-
tailer by manufacturers. As such, primarily the study advocates that (1) retailers 
may rely on “safe players” in relation to category drive and expansion whilst 
(2) retailers are best off approaching “productors” with requests for private la-
bels. Conversely, certainly it is not recommendable for retailers to approach 
“safe players” with requests for private labels; nor should they rely on “produc-
tors” in relation to category drive and expansion. Consequently, the study sug-
gests that retailers should “pay due respect” to the two different types of pur-
poses for manufacturers’ NPD and henceforward, “safe players” new attribute 
line extensions should be evaluated against their ability to expand and/or extend 
the focal product category whereas other evaluation criteria, e.g. optimisation of 
product categories, should be employed when retailers are confronted with slot-
filler line extensions. 
 
Due to the fact that “productors” and “safe players” hold different sets of com-
petencies and thus offer different things to retailers, a key concern of retailers 
seems to be to build portfolios of manufacturer relations that correspond with 
retailers’ strategic intents for the various product categories carried by the re-
tailer in question. As such, in relation to product categories of importance to 
retailers’ image it seems necessary to collaborate with both “productors” and 
“safe players”; at least if the retailer wishes to offer consumers strong brands 
capable of driving the category by means of new attribute line extensions and a 
“suitable” private label substitute. On the other hand, for product categories that 
are not focal to the retailer, a deliberate choice can be made to either “source” 
category drive and management to the manufacturer, the brand of whom defines 
 
32the category the most or to rely on “productors” to develop private label prod-
ucts that satisfy consumers’ needs in relation to that specific category. 
 
Apart from the managerial implications for retailers at a “portfolio” level, the 
study suggests that – at a “dyadic” level – manufacturers’ brand or product em-
phasis hold severe implications for communication and collaboration. Broadly 
speaking, the study suggests that retailers should “talk” brands with “safe play-
ers” whereas communication with “productors” should concentrate on “talking” 
products. Consequently, the study offers retailers a way to “tap in” on realities 
as enacted by “productor” and “safe player” marketing departments respec-
tively. As such, a key implication of the study is that it should facilitate retail-
ers’ “enactment” of the prominence of brand thinking for manufacturers with 
whom they collaborate. 
 
Furthermore, the study advocates that retailers are aware of underlying power 
structures within manufacturer companies (prod; sales and safe players; market-
ing). Thus, retailers should communicate more with “safe playing” marketing 
departments than with “safe playing” sales departments whereas collaboration 
with “productors” should be based on relations with sales departments to a far 
greater extent. 
 
Finally, if retailers wish to collaborate with FMCG manufacturers, they should 
pay due respect to the competencies and key success factors of safe players and 
productors respectively. Hence, retailers should offer to help “productors” in 
relation to NPD phases and activities in regard to which “productors” lack fun-
damental competencies. Conversely, retailers should demand that “safe players” 
new attribute line extensions are developed on the basis of thorough completion 
of (all) stages and activities fundamental to such NPD projects. 
 
Closing this section of the paper, table 2 (below) summarises key implications 




33Table 2.  Implications for Retailers’ Management of Manufacturer 
 Relations 




To assure that manufacturer actually 
expands and extends focal product 
category 
To build retailer image by means of 
private labels and/or to offer consumers 





Brands  Products 
Levels of  
collaboration 
Low – no collaboration in relation to 
e.g. NPD 
High – in relation to NPD retailers 
should assume control of e.g. the 






To understand ways in which brands 
act as NPD related core rigidities. 
To be able to communicate with 
marketing departments on the basis 
of “brand thinking” 
To “move productors beyond” extant 
product focus. 
To communicate knowledge on con-
sumers to “productors” in order for 
such knowledge to underlie NPD 
6.  Conclusion 
Drawing on a theory-building, multiple case study, the paper elaborates on 
brand manufacturers’ development of line extensions. On the basis of the en-
riched understanding of such development activities, the study identified two 
archetypes of FMCG companies (i.e. “safe players” and “productors”). Due to 
the characteristics discriminating between “productors” and “safe players” line 
extending NPD activities, the paper further suggests that retailers’ relations 
with “safe players” and “productors” might differ fundamentally. 
 
As for retailers’ management of relations with manufacturers, the study sug-
gests that retailers are “best off” collaborating with “productors” in develop-
 
34ment and management of private brands whilst “equators” should provide re-
tailers with a portfolio of national brands that build store traffic. Furthermore, 
the study advocates that retailers should base collaboration with “productors” 
and “safe players” on thorough understanding of fundamental characteristics 
and competencies of these archetypes of FMCG brand manufacturers. Conse-
quently, the hope is that the paper contributes to enrichment of retailers’ under-
standing of manufacturers; however incremental such enrichment might be. 
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